Despite HAVA, controversy continues over secure and accessible systems.
By Rob Ingraham
Few national elections ignited more controversy and ill will than the 2000 presidential election and, to a large extent, the discord turned on the seemingly simple mechanics of casting a vote. Almost two million ballots were disqualifi ed because they registered multiple votes or none at all when run through vote-counting machines. Florida’s system of punch cards, the notorious “chad” debates, and charges of voter disenfranchisement went all the way to the United States Supreme Court and to this day many Americans believe the election was “stolen.”
Congress, besieged with petitions to fix what was widely viewed as a broken system, came up with the “Help America Vote Act” (HAVA), which was signed by President Bush a year after his inauguration. The goals of HAVA, enacted on October 29, 2002, were to replace punch card voting systems, create an Election Assistance Commission to help run federal elections, and to establish minimum election administration standards. HAVA mandates that all states and localities upgrade election procedures including voting machines, registration procedures, and poll worker training. The specifics were left up to each state but HAVA requires that all voting systems must:
- permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;
- provide the voter with the opportunity to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast (including issuing a replacement ballot if necessary; and
- notify the voter of errors such as undervotes or overvotes and provide a chance for the voter to correct the error.
Critics of HAVA claim that attempting to solve a problem like Florida’s punch card system by requiring expensive and complicated electronic voting machines was overkill and some considered it a thinly-veiled attempt to enrich a few vendors. Others have also charged that most of the billions allocated to the states to implement HAVA have been spent to increase access for voters with disabilities, while the main goals of HAVA—preventing another Florida fiasco—have been ignored.
Touch Screen Systems under Suspicion
But the most common voting system for voters with disabilities is, itself, under fire. A study by election reform groups Demos and Voter Action entitled “Improving Access to Voting: A Report on the Technology for Accessible Voting Systems” claims that “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines, once considered essential to ensuring private and independent voting booth access for voters with disabilities, often do not work as promised.”
The study notes that “[D]ue to inadequate or malfunctioning voting machines, voters with disabilities are frequently forced to ask for assistance or compromise the privacy of their vote- severe violations of federal disability accommodation requirements” It also cites “the lack of a controllable interface for those who are unable to use touch screens or tactile key inputs; inadequate audio access features for people with visual or cognitive impairments, with dyslexia, or with severe motor- impairments; and lack of privacy curtains to prevent others from reading the voters’ selections on their visual displays.” (www. voteraction.org/news/02-14-071. html).
States in Turmoil
Implementing HAVA has stirred almost as much controversy as it was meant to resolve. New York State, charged with replacing about 20,000 lever-type voting machines under HAVA, received $220 million in federal funding to implement the act by 2006 but missed the deadline and was sued by the U.S. Department of Justice. Under a settlement agreement, the DOJ is closely monitoring New York’s progress and the state Board of Elections must soon submit a plan for compliance. The Board slipped further behind this year when it suspended testing due to vendor problems and announced that the earliest it would be in compliance with HAVA is 2009. In an attempt to have the machines up and working in every New York county in time for the 2008 presidential election, the state proposed an abbreviated certifi cation process that was promptly attacked by disability advocates who charged that the plan failed to give people with disabilities a method of verifying the accuracy of their votes. Opposing organizations include The Independent Living Center of the Hudson Valley, The New York Public Interest Research Group, and the League of Women Voters.
According to the National Organization on Disability’s voting access project, people with disabilities cannot cast a secret ballot with most of the current electronic voting machines.
Casting a long shadow across all touch screen electronic voting machines was a July report from California announcing that computer scientists had successfully hacked into three widely-used California machines and found several ways that vote tallies could be altered. Acting at the state’s request, scientists hacked into touch-screen systems from three of the four largest manufacturers: Diebold Election Systems (Diebold, Inc. changed the unit’s name to Premier Election Solutions this year), Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems. Mathew Bishop, a professor of computer science at California State University, Davis, who led the hacking team, said he was surprised how easy it was, not only to pick the physical locks on the machines but also to break through the software defenses meant to block intruders.
Sobered in part by the California hacker study, Florida— the “poster child” for dysfunctional voting systems—decided to scrap 25,000 touch screen machines which the state bought after the 2000 recount at about $5,000 each. Efforts to sell the machines have been unsuccessful. Palm Beach County alone has to unload 4,900 machines for which it paid $14.5 million and still owes $4.8 million. One official said, “They are probably, for the most part, headed for the scrap pile.” Statewide, there are still six counties owing a combined $33 million on the machines, most of which were bought in haste to comply with HAVA which banned punch card and lever-style systems. Most of the money came from the federal government, which will also pay for most of the replacement machines. Voters with disabilities will continue using the machines until 2012.
In Massachusetts, Diebold—one of the manufacturers whose system got hacked in California—has sued the state for choosing a rival firm, AutoMARK, in a recent $9-million solicitation for thousands of voting systems for people with disabilities. Diebold wants the selection overturned, seeking a review of the records to explain how the Offi ce of the Secretary of State made its decision. Chicago-based AutoMARK Technical Systems, LLC, makes an optical scan device that uses a paper ballet that the company says is designed for people who are personally unable to mark an optical scan ballot die to physical limitations or language barriers. AutoMARK claims its system has been implemented in “over 2,000 jurisdictions throughout the U.S. in the part 12 months.” Secretary of State William Galvin said his offi ce surveyed disability groups who had tried the machine and there was a consensus in favor of AutoMARK.
Amending HAVA In an attempt to amend HAVA, New Jersey Representative Rush Holt (D-12) has been pressing the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (HR 811), which is designed to address concerns that, in the event of another debacle like the Florida count in 2000, there is no way to verify vote counts on electronic touch screen voting machines. Holt’s bill requires the following for all federal elections starting in 2008:
- All voting machines must produce a paper ballot.
- All voting machines must be auditable.
- All voting machine vendors must make the machines’ software available for inspection.
- Prohibits wireless technology in voting machines.
- Ensures disabled and minority language voters can vote privately and independently.
But again, many states may have to scrap systems they bought specifically to comply with HAVA if HR 811 becomes law. In North Carolina the bill could require counties to spend millions to replace equipment bought just a year ago. Nearly a fourth of North Carolina counties use touch screen DRE machines and HR 811 could force them to reinvest in new technology. “It’s a very good-intentioned bill that is not practical, reasonable, or cost- effective,” said Gary Bartlett, the state elections director. “We’d have to get rid of just about everything in 2012.”
Another prominent critic of HR 811 is the New York City-based Independent Village Democrats who claim, “Even with a paper trail, the legal votes are inside computer electronic circuits and concealed from the voter himself. Election observers cannot understand, witness, and attest to the proper and honest handling, storage, and counting of these invisible electronic ballots.”
Further, HR 811 “should mandate election equipment that enables average citizens who vote, work at the polls, and observe elections to participate fully and observe appropriately, rather than forcing us to ‘trust’ computer experts.”
One of the most active members of the disability community addressing voter access is James C. Dickson, vice president for governmental affairs at the American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD). He also leads the AAPD’s Disability Vote Project, a broad coalition of 36 national disability-related organizations, including United Spinal Association, formed to close the political participation gap for people with disabilities. Dickson estimates that about 40% of the disability community has access to voting, at some level and, of that, “probably 20 to 30%” are fully accessible.
While AAPD does not endorse a specific technology, Dickson said that “touch screen technology, when done right, offers accessibility to a greater variety of disabilities and it takes less time to vote than paper ballots” Dickson acknowledges, however, that “some touch screen systems have been a disaster.”
But designing, manufacturing, and certifying new machines is a long process. Among the reasons are that manufacturers must build machines that can be certified in every state “and there are 50 very distinct sets of laws,” Dickson said. Language is also a problem. “In some counties in California, there are as many as 10 different languages” and ballots must be tailored to accommodate all of them. Dickson also explained that election observers have determined that there is a clear advantage— between three and four percent— for candidates listed first on a ballot and to offset this, some states vary the position of candidate names from ballot to ballot. Dickson noted that this can been done easily with electronic voting machines, but for paper ballots the problem gets far more complicated.
He also noted that there are only about four players in the voting machine business and the machines are not a “high profit margin business. You don’t make a killing.” Among the reasons are the complexity of the machines, the need for a large maintenance staff to service machines over a wide geographic area, and the fact that companies have to pay for each state certification, which can take as long as a year.
Commenting on the potential for fraud, Dickson noted, “It’s counterintuitive, but paper ballots are more prone to fraud than touch screen machines. The number of people that can mess with paper ballots is gigantic.” Dickson explained that, with paper ballots, “You can’t keep the chain of custody secure,” whereas with a compact disc, for instance, one can be reasonably confident that nothing has been added or subtracted to the tally. Further, when the number of paper ballots gets into the tens of thousands, each time the vote is counted, whether it’s by hand or by machine, you get a different number. “Even without fraud, if the totals keep coming out different, the loser will see fraud.”
Regarding Rep. Holt’s HAVA amendment bill, HR 811, AAPD does not support the changes. “We oppose it because, in effect, it eliminates accessibility and will end innovation in voting systems.”
Rob Ingraham is senior editor.
